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THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

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ABSTRACT

The involvement by the Department of Defense in recent domestic and international events like the "ethnic cleansing" events taking place in the former Yugoslavia, the famine and starvation in Somalia, the civil riots in Los Angeles following the Rodney King beating trial verdict, the Haitian migrant exodus to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba following the collapse of their government, and the devastation caused by Hurricane Andrew in southern Florida have sparked discussions between those who favor, and those who oppose, the use of our military in performing non-traditional military roles.

The use of our military in performing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts is not something "new", like some would argue. The military has been performing these missions since our country's inception. Recent examples are the use of U.S. armed forces in humanitarian relief efforts in Iraq, Somalia, Bangladesh, Russia, Bosnia, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

This paper provides an understanding of the Department of Defense's role in the areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and discusses how humanitarian assistance, when properly applied, serves as an instrument of the foreign policy of the United States.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

"Preoccupation with humanitarian duties, narcotics interdiction, and all the rest of the peripheral missions left the military unfit to engage an authentic military opponent. Performing the new missions sapped resources from what most experts agree was one of the vital ingredients to victory in the First Gulf War: training. Training is, quite literally, a zero-sum game. Each moment spent performing a non-traditional mission is one unavailable for orthodox military exercises."(21)

The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012.

The involvement by the Department of Defense in recent domestic and international events like the "ethnic cleansing" events taking place in the former Yugoslavia, the famine and starvation in Somalia, the civil riots in Los Angeles following the Rodney King beating trial verdict, the Haitian migrant exodus to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba following the collapse of their government, and the devastation caused by Hurricane Andrew in southern Florida have sparked discussions between those who favor, and those who oppose, the use of our military in performing non-traditional military roles. The purpose of this research paper is to provide an understanding of the Department of Defense's role in the areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and to discuss how humanitarian assistance, when properly applied, serves as an instrument of the foreign policy of the United States.

During his opening comments at the 1992 National Defense University's Topical Symposium, Lieutenant General Paul G. Cerjan, U.S. Army, President of the National Defense University, said it best when he stated that the U.S. military has been performing non-traditional roles, like the ones mentioned above, since our country's inception. These so called non-traditional military roles are by no means something "new", like some would argue. Starting with the exploration of the west by Lewis and Clark, this kind of support has included: the protection of the American Indian Reservations of the 1850s through 1890s; riot control from the 1863 New York city draft riots; the reconstruction service in the former confederacy (1865-1877); racial disturbances in inner-cities during the 1960s; security protection during the integration of the public school system in the south; and humanitarian assistance after natural disasters like the great San Francisco earthquakes - and more recently - Hurricane Andrew.(15)

On foreign soil, the U.S. military has conducted humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from the Berlin airlift to famines in Ethiopia, Bangladesh, and more recently, Somalia. It has also provided refugee assistance and protection of the Kurds in northern Iraq, the refugee

problem immediately following Desert Storm and the Haitian migrant humanitarian relief effort in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The military has also participated in peacekeeping operations in the Suez Canal in 1956 and as a member of the multinational police force in the Sinai even today. It has supported law and order efforts including the drug interdiction in Central and South America, to the more recent Los Angeles riots.(15)

For the past seven years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has conducted humanitarian and civic assistance programs in support of broader U.S. foreign policy objectives. DOD's assistance, provided to more than 75 countries worldwide, has enhanced military-to-military relations, improved relations with the people of several countries, and made a major contribution to the relief of human suffering. This assistance takes many forms, including donation of excess food, clothing and medical supplies, construction of schools and roads by U.S. military personnel, foreign disaster assistance, and the transportation by U.S. military aircraft of privately donated humanitarian cargo.(2:pp18) Some recent examples are the use of U.S. military forces in humanitarian relief efforts in Iraq, Somalia, Bangladesh, Russia, Bosnia and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Questions about the effectiveness of the disaster relief effort in the wake of Hurricane Andrew clearly demonstrated that the nation needs to review the systems and methods used in reacting to domestic natural disasters and providing humanitarian relief efforts. With the demise of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold-War (resulting in a diminished role for the Department of Defense), many would argue that the Department of Defense is the agency best suited to respond quickly and effectively to our nation's natural disasters.

Congress is "demanding" that a smaller military, in this new era void of a national security threat, get more involved in civilian activities. In the view of Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn, D-Ga, disaster relief seems to be a "natural" role for our post Cold-War military.(3:pp33).

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

FEMA is the central point of contact within the federal government for a wide range of emergency management activities in both peace and war. It is dedicated to working closely with all the members of the emergency management community to improve national preparedness and

increase our ability to respond to all types of emergencies. FEMA supports state and local governments in the fulfillment of their emergency planning, preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery responsibilities. It is also responsible for coordinating the disaster assistance provided by all other federal agencies. As necessary, FEMA provides funding, technical assistance, supplies, equipment and training.(24)

One of FEMA's most visible form of assistance occurs when the President declares an emergency or major disaster. This declaration is made when the severity of the situation cannot be handled by local and state efforts resulting in a request by the Governor of the affected area to the President. FEMA will evaluate the damage, identify the requirements for supplemental federal assistance and will make a recommendation to the President. Direct disaster assistance from FEMA falls into two categories: public assistance (aid to state and local governments) and individual assistance (aid for disaster victims and their families).(24)

Military Support to Civil Authorities.

As the likelihood of global war continues to diminish, and as threats at home (such as drugs and terrorism) become more complex, the Department of Defense responds to conflicting pressures. DOD willingly accepts the need to reduce the size of the force and budget; and will respond to expanding requests for military assistance in civil emergencies and disasters, both at home and abroad.(25)

The primary responsibility for humanitarian assistance within the United States Government rests with the Department of State and the Agency for International Development (AID), in the international arena, and with FEMA, in the domestic arena. With certain exceptions that apply uniquely to DOD, the major and normal role for DOD is to support the other Federal departments and agencies. (6)

Since 1980, all defense planning for civil emergencies has involved dynamic relationships with FEMA, which leads federal programs for civil defense and disaster assistance.(25) From a Department of Defense perspective, the term humanitarian assistance encompasses numerous areas which include: humanitarian/civic assistance; disaster relief; surplus property disposal; and space available

transportation of humanitarian relief supplies. I will limit my discussions to addressing DOD's role in providing humanitarian/civic assistance and disaster relief in accordance with the provisions stated in chapter 20 of Title 10 of the United States Code.

Title 10 of the United States Code: Armed Forces.

Chapter 20 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code addresses the terms and conditions under which the Department of Defense can provide humanitarian and civic assistance in conjunction with military operations. The Secretary of Defense has the authority to permit humanitarian and other civic assistance activities, in conjunction with authorized military operations, when they are likely to promote the security interests of both the United States and the country in which the activities are to be carried out; and the specific operational readiness skills of the military members involved in the operation.(7:401.a&b)

All humanitarian and civic assistance activities carried out by the Department of Defense must complement, and not duplicate, any other form of social or economic assistance being provided to a country by any other department or agency of the United States. Humanitarian and

civic assistance cannot be provided to individuals, groups, or organizations involved in military activities; or any foreign country unless the Secretary of State specifically approves the assistance.(7:401.3b)

The term "humanitarian and civic assistance", as used throughout this paper and in chapter 20 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code, means:

- o medical, dental and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country;
- o construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems;
- o well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and
- o rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. (7:401.3e)

The Secretary of Defense is authorized to transport to any country, without charge, supplies furnished by a non-governmental source which are intended for humanitarian assistance. These supplies, however, may only be transported on a space available basis. The Secretary cannot authorize the transportation of these supplies unless

it is consistent with the foreign policy of the United States; the supplies are suitable for humanitarian purposes and are in usable condition; there is a legitimate humanitarian need for the supplies by the people for whom they are intended; the supplies will in fact be used for humanitarian purposes; and adequate arrangements have been made for the distribution of the supplies once they reach their destination.(7:402.ala-e)

Redirection of our military's resources.

During the 1992 presidential campaign, then Governor Bill Clinton called for redirecting the human and physical resources of our defense establishment that won the Cold-War to address domestic problems. Senator Sam Nunn has been an advocate of the use of our military to help solve America's ills. In a 28 December 1992 article in the Atlanta Constitution, Senator Nunn stated that "the primary mission of our defense establishment must continue to be to provide for our national security...as long as we must retain a substantial defense establishment to meet our national security needs, we should use the considerable capability of the military services to meet pressing domestic needs consistent with their military training and mission."
(8:pp13)

In 1992 Congress passed legislation directed towards the use of military resources to meet domestic needs. A key objective of this legislation is to get role models from the military working in local schools and communities. Senator Nunn argues that currently there is a large minority population in the military (397,000 black and 93,000 hispanic men and women). We should capitalize on this fact. While performing their regular military missions, their innovative and flexible involvement in local community outreach and mentoring programs can send a powerful message to our youth - that discipline, commitment and hard work matter.

Senator Nunn also proposed, and congress enacted, a proposal to encourage highly trained service members leaving the military services to take critical civilian jobs. If implemented, this legislation would permit military members with between 15 to 20 years of service to retire and earn additional retirement credit by working in fields such as law enforcement and education. Military officers holding advanced degrees in areas like math and sciences could easily move into teaching jobs at the high school or college level to fill the serious national shortage of math and science teachers. Teacher certification requirements and

issues that surface as a result of this initiative must be addressed, resolved and managed at the local level.

As an example, recently, 50 former drill sergeants, infantry officers and other military specialists fanned out on a new mission - making housing projects better places to live. All participating service members were selected from a pool of 1,500 applicants for their organizational and people skills. The soldiers were drawn to the program by ads in military newspapers, which sought veterans to "handle disorder and uncertainty" and be "a distinct and important role model." They were all males and most were black. This effort was part of a new federal program aimed at providing new jobs for soldiers whose careers have been cut short by military cutbacks, while making tough, inner-city neighborhoods safer. The program, dubbed LEAP, for Leadership Employment for Armed Services Personnel, is receiving tremendous reviews from numerous state/county Departments of Housing and Urban Development. Most states are "very excited" about the idea of no-nonsense military people working in public housing. When interviewed, service members participating in the LEAP program state that they believe that the skills that they honed in the armed forces are valuable in their new jobs. They believe that even one military person with the right skills can make a significant

difference in improving the living conditions within inner-city housing projects. (9:pp13)

Opportunities also exist for active and reserve military units to provide assistance to local communities while training for their military missions. For example, military medical units, particularly the National Guard units, whose members are already an integral part of existing communities, could train for their military missions by providing basic services to people who don't have access to medical care. Another example deals with our growing homeless problem, we may be able to use military combat engineers to address this emergency domestic need by working with local communities to convert and refurbish old facilities into shelters for the homeless. This is a great and realistic training opportunity for all levels of a military organization.

Hurricane Andrew: A Major Natural Disaster.

It seems like every passing day now we hear more about the unique power and efficiency of the military and how we should be harnessing this wonderful power to solve our domestic social problems and serve larger societal goals. On 27 January 1993 a series of "relief specialists"

testified before a Senate subcommittee, which funds the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and argued that the military should be given major responsibility in dealing with floods, hurricanes and other natural disasters. FEMA has been under fire for its poor response to Hurricane Andrew and the answer given to congress by these "relief specialists" for FEMA's ineptness, in a nutshell, was - "call in the Army." (10:pp14)

An important policy issue that is being discussed on Capitol Hill is whether responsibility for federal emergency management should be taken from FEMA and turned over to the military. FEMA Director, Wallace E. Stickney explains that a military takeover of emergency management, proposed by some members of Congress, is a "dicey proposition that gets into complex questions about federal-state relations and about how other nations have fared under military top-down solutions in natural disasters". He suggests instead, that Congress give FEMA the authority and funds to preposition relief personnel in potential disaster areas, stockpile essential equipment - such as generators, water purifiers and ice-makers - and respond to disasters even when states do not ask for assistance.(22)

Hurricane Andrew's assault on Florida on 24 August 1992 was by far the costliest catastrophe in U.S. history. Andrew flattened practically everything in its path in a 25-mile-wide rampage across South Florida leaving a trail of destruction and dazed people. It took 41 lives and caused over \$20 billion in property damage. Hurricane Andrew continued across the Gulf of Mexico to cause another \$1.5 billion in losses in Louisiana. To put Andrew's devastation in more human terms:

- o Nearly 125,000 homes and apartments were damaged and 160,000 people had to find other places to live.
- o 85,000 jobs were lost.
- o 82,000 businesses were damaged or destroyed.

As a result of the extensive damage caused in Florida, President Bush declared it a major disaster and authorized federal relief to the area. FEMA and the Federal Response Plan played a major role in coordinating and managing the federal response to this major natural disaster.

The Federal Response Plan.

The Federal Response Plan was designed by FEMA to address response to the consequences of any disaster or emergency situation in which there is a need for Federal response assistance under the authorities of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988. Wallace E. Stickney, FEMA Director describes it as "the operations bible for the Joint Federal Task Force which responds to and assists in the recovery from major disasters. The Department of Defense is an important element in this task force".(26) The plan describes the basic mechanisms and structures by which the Federal government will mobilize resources and conduct activities to augment State and local response efforts. It uses a functional approach to group the types of Federal assistance which a State is most likely to need under 12 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). Each ESF is headed by a Primary Agency, which has been selected based on its authorities, resources and capabilities in a particular functional area. The Department of Defense has Primary Agency management responsibility for two of these ESF's - Urban Search and Rescue, and Public Works and Engineering. It is responsible

however, for supporting all remaining ESFs identified in the Federal Response Plan.(17:pp1)

Upon the activation of the Federal Response Plan, following Hurricane Andrew's strike of south Florida, the Secretary of the Army, as the Department of Defense (DOD) Executive Agent, appointed the Commander-In-Chief of Forces Command (CINCFOR) as the operating agent and assigned him the mission of conducting disaster relief in support of FEMA in accordance with the Federal Response Plan. CINCFOR was responsible for supporting all ESFs identified in the Federal Response Plan as having DOD responsibility.(14:pp3)

Four days after Hurricane Andrew's assault on Southern Florida, the largest-ever peacetime military operation began. The cleanup operation involved over 24,000 U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Canadian Forces deployed to Florida in the largest peacetime CONUS deployment ever. According to an Army Times reporter, members of the Army were left with the brunt of traffic control, among numerous other tasks, including:

- o Guarding business and trucks with food or valuables from looters and armed robbers.
- o Providing generators and fuel.

- o Doling out clothes, bottled water and canned foods donated by citizens across the world.
- o Cooking and serving hot food.
- o Providing medical attention and medevac airlifts.
- o Transporting and protecting relief supplies.
- o Clearing debris and removing trees from houses, cars and house streets.
- o Searching for and removing corpses and disposing of animal carcasses.
- o Chlorinating truckloads of water.
- o Supplying tents, showers and latrines.
- o Patching roofs and doing minor repair and carpentry work. (4:pp12)

Even though there was significant damage in Louisiana, the state was better prepared than Florida. This resulted in reduced requests for DOD support. CINCFOR's operations centered on relief and recovery operations in Florida. In total, the military successfully completed 99 FEMA taskings; cleared six million cubic yards of debris; constructed and

operated four life support centers; established and operated three depots and a donated goods reception point to receive, store and distribute humanitarian goods; provided 67,000 civilians with medical care; and repaired 98 schools.(14:pp4)

The military's response to the devastation in Florida was a tremendous success. We can honestly say that the military proved, once again, that it is a capable, trained and ready force. Given little or no time to prepare and working with mission type orders, the military proved that it is able to serve the nation with distinction. But even though it was a huge success, problems were identified throughout the conduct of the operation which clearly identify a need for improvement in certain areas. These areas were identified and discussed in the FORSCOM After Action Report and are as follows:

- o DOD's Catastrophic Disaster Role.
- o Determination of Mission Accomplishment.
- o Lack of Disaster Relief Doctrine.
- o Use of Reserve Personnel and Forces.
- o Rapid Catastrophic Disaster Response.

- o Engineer Operations and Sustainment.
- o JTF Establishment, Organization and Personnel Accountability.
- o Health Care.

I will only briefly comment on the first four areas identified above. Although all areas are important, I feel that, if not properly addressed, these four areas will have the greatest impact on the success of future disaster relief operations.

DOD's Catastrophic Disaster Role. Recent catastrophic disasters, like Hurricane Andrew, have required greater military response than envisioned in the Federal Response Plan. While DOD is the lead federal agency for two ESFs, during Hurricane Andrew it provided the initial response forces for many of the ESFs. This was attributed to the lack of large pools of manpower to draw from by the other agencies. In a disaster of the magnitude of Andrew, where rapid and massive support is required, DOD becomes the principal initial response agency. DOD has the organization and ability to provide rapid, massive, initial relief, but it does not currently have the mission to do so. If DOD is

expected to provide the initial response to catastrophic disasters two things must happen:

- o FEMA and DOD plans must be changed accordingly to reflect DOD's initial response requirements.
- o Provisions for an automatic response to catastrophic disasters must be established, based on a preestablished criteria, to facilitate a faster response to disasters.(14:pp4)

Determination of Mission Accomplishment. There is currently no guidance to help identify when the military portion of disaster response should end. Mission accomplishment criteria for specific disasters need to be established to prevent lead ESF agencies from continuing to rely on the military to provide support after the military has massively responded.(14:pp5)

Lack of Disaster Relief Doctrine. Little guidance is available at any level on how to organize and conduct humanitarian relief operations in general, and disaster relief operations in particular. The Federal Response Plan provides little information on the conduct of disaster

relief operations. There are no current military publications, to include joint or Army doctrinal publications, that address this subject matter.(14:pp6)

Use of Reserve Personnel and Forces. DOD needs better access to Reserve Component (RC) forces. Title 10 USC 67 3b currently prohibits the involuntary call-up of RC forces to conduct disaster relief operations. RC personnel, units and equipment are a valuable assets for the conduct of disaster relief operations. We need to work towards getting these restrictions changed. We need to be able to involuntarily call up individuals or units if the situation requires.(14:pp6&7)

According to Deborah A. Hart, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections for FEMA, FEMA is already laying the foundation to correct many of these issues. Her office has made 113 recommendations to improve and expedite an accelerated Federal role in future disasters. Due to the reaction of the public and Congress to the Federal performance in Florida after Hurricane Andrew, all recommendations were based on the assumption that, in the future, a more timely response will be authorized and expected.(18:pp1)

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief : A
Non-Traditional Military Role.

An argument against.

Mr. Seth Cropsey, Director of the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, has commented on numerous occasions on the subject of Non-Traditional Roles of the Military. In a recent Wall Street Journal editorial he argues that the assertion of Post-Cold War American power in the world will require a strong military carrying out its traditional military mission. While others argue that, with the absence of a single, powerful enemy, the military must be made to perform "non-traditional" functions, he contends that in the strictest sense, there is no such thing as a purely military mission. "Whether the immediate aim is to defend American life and property, as it was in Panama, or to protect American strategic interests, as it was in the Gulf War, force is no more or less than one of several ways to achieve political objectives".(11)

The model for this new role may very well be the U.S.-led effort to restore order in Somalia. Mr. Cropsey continues on to say that our participation in the Somalian effort is different. Marines are performing an essentially constabulary role - instead of the combat mission for which

they have trained. This new role, he argues, is being used to confirm the notion that, with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, U.S. forces must change themselves essentially. The current thinking in Washington on this issue can best be described by a statement made by the Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn in June of 1992 when he stated that the U.S. military has "a proper and important role" in battling such domestic problems as "drugs, poverty, urban decay, lack of self-esteem, unemployment, and racism".(11)

He believes that if the military changes its purpose and substitutes for its role as a combatant some less demanding activity, this will inevitably transform the organization. Providing humanitarian assistance, helping build needed improvements in a nation's infrastructure, supporting law enforcement officials, and administering to the victims of disasters are good, honorable and admirable activities that are entirely worthy goals of a decent American national security policy. Such a policy can be supported within reasonable limits. However, if these activities become the military's mission, the danger and stress of combat will cease to guide the training of our armed forces. They will still wear uniforms, march, and look like a military force, but they will lose the edge that

is honed by the realities of war. It is the training for the eventualities of war which makes our military as proficient as it is at providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Because the military is so well trained for combat it is able easily to perform such difficult tasks as, helping hurricane victims and organizing the logistics necessary to look after large numbers of refugees.(12)

If in the "stylish" pursuit of adopting to somebody's notion of a new world order, or justifying its current levels, the military opts to change its role from a combatant to a non-combatant one, the armed forces will gradually turn into, and will be seen by the public, as merely just another federal agency. The Defense Department will lose both its seemingly effortless ability to help those stricken by disaster, as well as its more important responsibility in defending the interests of the United States in a world which, if less dangerous now than in the recent past, promises nothing except to be more dangerous again in the future.(12)

An argument for.

Lieutenant General H. J. Hatch, U.S. Army (Ret.), as a panel member in the National Defense University's Symposium on Non-Traditional Roles of the U.S. Military in the Post-Cold War Era, made some interesting comments on the use of the military in responding to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief needs. He argues that there seems to be a dangerous tendency to disconnect non-combat roles of our armed forces from national security. A trap that we must all avoid.

Non-combat roles for our military are just as vital to our national security as are our combat roles. At this juncture in our history we in the Department of Defense need to again consider why we exist as an institution. We exist not only to deter war, and fight and win if deterrence fails, but we also exist to promote peace. Promoting peace is the possible set of our primary central core missions of deter, and if necessary, fight and win.

Being a retired Army officer he argues that if you read military operations manuals, like the Army's Field Manual 100-5, Operations - a manual that explains how Army forces plan and conduct campaigns, major operations, battles and

engagements in conjunction with other services and allies (27) - you will find that peace is fully acknowledged as the desired state and that peace will be promoted while deterring armed conflict. However, if the first two fail, we will seek a decisive victory and return as a nation to peace.(13)

He believes that the sustained security of the United States can only be obtained and perpetuated when we and our other interests overseas are at peace. When our efforts fail to preserve peace, those of us who have focused on the training and preparation of men and women for war so that they would not only survive but succeed on the battlefield, would be the first to order them into harms way. The stakes are high, but the armed forces of the United States are the primary stakeholders in successfully promoting peace.(13)

He argues that the question that we must all ask ourselves is whether promoting peace, by conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, will detract from our readiness. The answer to this question is that "it depends" on the the type of unit and the specific type of action that you might propose that they take in a non-combat role. The detraction from combat readiness experienced by a military unit performing in a non-combat role would range

depending on the type of unit. The detraction from combat readiness for certain close-combat units to be engaged in a protracted way in a non-combat mission would be greater than the one experienced by a combat support or combat service support unit.

For the vast majority of combat support and combat service support units, non-combat missions - like disaster relief and humanitarian assistance - will not detract from their military readiness, in fact these non-combat missions can provide opportunities that no basic training program on a military installation could provide. As an example, an engineer unit involved in non-combat activities in Latin America is performing the finest training for combat. It can use its heavy construction equipment and do things with explosives and demolitions that they could not do in Fort Hood or Fort Bragg.(13)

Some have argued that military participation in humanitarian and disaster relief efforts will cause the dangers and stress of combat to cease guiding the training of our armed forces. Nothing could be further from the truth. The stress in the hearts, minds and bodies of our military personnel engaged in Hurricane Andrew, the Loma Prieta earthquake, the Los Angeles riots, Provide Comfort,

and other activities such as these was just as real as any combat, and done without the expense or horrors of war. The energy and character developed through peacetime activities such as these, prepared our military personnel tremendously to fight and win in Operation Desert Storm.(13)

Providing international humanitarian assistance affords us with the opportunity to influence people, institutions and events through such activities as infrastructure development, medical assistance, communications, and training. The peaceful use of our military power is the most eloquent use of our nation's capabilities and we should not deny it to the world. Enabling friendly host governments to meet the basic needs of their people is an excellent way of providing assistance. We are assisting, not building. Infrastructure development opens the door to economic opportunity and higher standards of living.(13)

Some have argued that if it had not been for the Saudi government's funding of U.S. Army Corps of Engineer supervision of the construction of over \$1.4 billion worth of largely military infrastructure on the Arabian peninsula over the past 25 years, Desert Shield and Desert Storm could not have been conducted on the timeline and on the scale that they were. It was the relationship that was

established through that development program and the U.S. military getting the job done, and leaving when it was finished that convinced the Saudis that they could trust the Americans to come in and do what had to be done, and to leave when they were finished.(13)

We must always be sensitive to our national will. We always have and always will look to the American people for our purpose and our mission. The American public is no longer receptive to our cold war missions. Many have already forgotten Desert Storm. If we are to retain the capability to fight our nation's wars in the future, we must be willing to adjust to the American people's perceptions and maintain a high level of relevancy to those missions they deem are appropriate and important for the Department of Defense. Our failure to adjust could very well cause us to wither, for lack of resources, to the level where we cannot rise quickly and responsively to fight our nation's wars.(13)

DOD's Role in Humanitarian Assistance.

With the cold-war over, the issue of when and where the U.S. should send in the armed forces is perhaps more open than it has been for years. A 1986 Defense Department

proclamation on the use of our military force stated that "the belief that the mere presence of U.S. troops...could be useful in some way is not sufficient for our government to ask our troops to risk their lives. If...a peacekeeping force...cannot fulfill its mission because there is no peace, then it should be withdrawn." Taken from the 1986 Pentagon's annual report to Congress, these passages echo the military's traditional reluctance to get involved in messy ambiguous situations.(28)

In 1984 then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger laid out what he called "Six Tests" that any situation would have to pass when U.S. officials weighed the use of U.S. force. Paraphrased, they are:

- o The US should not commit forces to combat unless its vital national interests, or those of its allies, are at stake.
- o If US leaders do decide to send troops, they should do so with the clear goal of winning. Actual forces should be sized accordingly.
- o Any commitment of force should have clearly defined political and military goals.

- o The relationship between goals and forces should be continually reassessed. If more troops are needed, send them: if it turns out our interests are not at stake, bring them home.
- o Any commitment of forces should have a reasonable assurance of the backing of the American people and the Congress.
- o Force should be a last resort.

Some experts in the application of U.S. military power hold the view that certain values are worth getting involved in and fighting for, while others say that only issues affecting our national security and prosperity are worth our involvement. While national policymakers argue for and against the use of the military in non-traditional roles (like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief), the media parades graphic displays of human suffering, both at home and abroad, to its viewers on a daily basis. These depictions have touched the hearts and minds of the American public, rising their human-consciousness to the point where they demand immediate U.S. involvement to stop the human suffering in places like Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Dade County, Florida.

I support the belief of Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman, Sam Nunn, when he states that "there is a proper and important role the armed forces can play in addressing the pressing issues that affect our country today; like drugs, poverty, urban decay, lack of self-esteem, unemployment and racism".(29) But he is refering to civic and disaster relief assistance that support the domestic needs of the United States, not the humanitarian assistance support provided by the military to other countries.

I believe that the criteria outlined by Mr. Caspar Weinberger for the application of U.S. military power equally applies to the use of our armed forces in humanitarian assistance roles overseas. With minor modifications, the same criteria can be used by policymakers to formulate policy on the use of our armed forces in providing humanitarian assistance abroad and the conditions for getting in and knowing when to get out. As I discussed earlier, the use of our armed forces in providing humanitarian and other assistance - in conjunction with military operations - to other countries is clearly spelled out in Chapter 20 of Title 10 of the United States Code.

Senator Nunn's proposal for the wide-range use of U.S. military forces to help meet domestic need has merit. His

plan calls for the authorization of the armed services to "engage in appropriate community service programs"(29) that could include:

- o Use of military personnel as "role models" in community service programs among young people whose families have been weakened by poverty, drugs and crime.
- o Assistance from active-duty and reserve units, especially those with engineering capabilities, in renovating public housing, schools and recreation facilities and improving temporary facilities, such as replacement for the women's and children's nutrition centers destroyed during the Los Angeles riots.
- o Recruitment of disadvantaged students for existing summer jobs at defense installations, where they could enroll in educational and other programs.
- o Cooperative use of some military facilities for job training and education, especially for inner-city residents.

- o Use of military medical personnel and facilities to provide infant vaccinations and other basic services to people who lack access to them.
- o Distribution of surplus military food to the hungry through civilian agencies.

All of these proposed projects are honorable and admirable activities that are easily doable by the military services, so long as they are consistent with military needs and do not compete with other government or private-sector services.

From a military readiness standpoint, units identified to participate in projects like these must be carefully selected to ensure that their participation does not detract from their readiness, but rather provide them with a realistic training opportunity that could not be obtained elsewhere.

As the military moves toward a smaller, more flexible force structure, it will be provided with a greater opportunity than in the past to use its assets and training to assist civilian efforts in critical domestic areas. We in the military must take advantage of this opportunity and

be willing to adjust to the change in times. We must continue to be sensitive to the will of the American people and accept those missions which they feel are appropriate to the Department of Defense. As Lieutenant General (Ret.) H. J. Hatch said during the National Defense University's Symposium on Non-Traditional Roles for the U.S. Military:

"Providing humanitarian assistance affords us with the opportunity to influence people, institutions and events...the peaceful use of our military power is the most eloquent use of our nation's capabilities and we should not deny it to the world."(13)

END NOTES

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